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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
No. 40619-2013 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON 
REVIEW 
This Court accepted review ofthe Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Nathan Herren, 
Docket No. 38783,2012 Opinion No. 59 (Idaho App., Nov. 9,2012), which reversed the district 
court's order, on intermediate appeal, affirming Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction for 
violation of a no contact order pursuant to 1. C. § 18-920 and affirming revocation of Mr. 
Herren's withheld judgment. 
B. Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings 
In the course of an ongoing dispute between Mr. Herren and his neighbor, William 
McDermott, Mr. Herren: 
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cut down a portion of McDermott's fence. Herren was charged with felony 
malicious injury to property and, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled guilty to an 
amended charge of misdemeanor malicious injury to property. The court entered a 
withheld judgment and placed Herren on probation for two years. In addition, the 
court entered a no contact order (NCO), providing, in relevant part, that Herren 
could not "knowingly remain within 100 feet of' McDermott. 
Opinion, p. 1-2. 
As homeowners in the subdivision, both Mr. Herren and Mr. McDermott were members 
of the homeowners association. Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12, In. 16-25; p. 123, In. 2-5. An annual 
homeowners association meeting was scheduled in January 2009, the purpose of which was to 
vote for new board members and address items such as the budget. Id. at p. 18, In. 11-19. Due 
to Mr. Herren's ongoing issues with the homeowners association board, Mr. Herren wanted to 
attend the meeting so that he could run for the board, present his side of issues and participate in 
financial discussions. Id. at p. 99, In. 12-19; p. 121, In. 20-25; p. 122, In. 5-12; p. 142, In. 16-18; 
p. 143, In. 5-7; p. 146, In. 6-9. 
Mr. Herren thus filed a motion to modify the NCO to allow him to attend homeowners' 
association meetings where Mr. McDermott, an association board member, would likely be 
present. Opinion, p.2. However, ten days before the meeting, Mr. Herren received notice that 
the annual meeting would be at the neighborhood elementary school instead of the neighborhood 
clubhouse. Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 97, In. 17 - p. 98, In. 18; p. 99, In. 23-24; Exh. A. Mr. Herren's 
son attends this elementary school and Mr. Herren believed the meeting would be held in the 
gymnasium, which he knew was well over 100 feet in size. Id. at p. 97, In. 17 - p. 98, In. 18; p. 
122, In. 18-23; p. 136, In 11 - p. 137, In. 7; p. 152, In. 1-7. Mr. Herren thus believed that he 
could attend the meeting without violating the 100 foot restriction in the NCO in the event Mr. 
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McDermott attended. Jd. 
When Mr. Herren and his son arrived for the annual meeting, he went to the gym where 
previous assemblies and programs had been held but discovered that the meeting was to be held in 
the library. Jd. at p. 151, In. 18 - p. 152, In. 7. Mr. Herren and his son arrived in the library and 
Mr. McDermott was not present. Jd. at p. 30, In. 17-20. Sometime thereafter, Mr. McDermott 
arrived. Immediately upon noticing Mr. McDermott, Mr. Herren and his young son moved from 
their seats in the middle of the room to the farthest back corner while Mr. McDermott sat with 
board members at the front of the room. Jd. at p. 21, In. 15 - p. 22, In. 6; p. 43, In. 2-6; p. 52, In. 
15 - p. 53, In. 4; p. 107, In. 7 - p. 108, In. 3.1 Mr. Herren counted ceiling tiles, which he estimated 
to be three feet in length, and estimated he was at least 100 feet away from the front of the room. 
Jd. at p. 110, In. 19 - p. 111, In. 12. 
Although Mr. McDermott did not perceive that Mr. Herren was causing a problem, the 
two were at opposite ends of the room from one another and seventy to eighty people were present 
at the homeowners association meeting Mr. McDermott phoned the police to complain that Mr. 
Herren was violating the NCO. Jd. at p. 23, In. 4-18. p. 38, In. 11-15; p. 42, In. 24 - p. 43, In. 6; p. 
67, In. 13-14. The officer went to the backdoor by which Mr. Herren was seated and Mr. Herren 
went outside to speak with him. Jd. at p. 82, In. 17-19. Mr. Herren told the officer that he 
believed he was more than 100 feet away. Jd. at p. 67, In. 19-20. The officer arrested Mr. Herren 
1 In its brief on review, the State indicates that once Mr. McDermott came into the 
meeting room, Mr. Herren "made eye contact with him, smiled, and moved to the back of the 
room." p.3. However, whether there was eye contact was disputed as neither Mr. McDermott's 
wife nor Mr. Herren recalled any eye contact. Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 61, In. 6-16; p. 107, In. 17-22. 
Because the State did not argue to the magistrate that it should find Mr. Herren guilty based on 
the brief eye contact, the magistrate never found whether Mr. Herren actually made eye contact 
and smiled. 
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and charged him with violating the NCO. Id. at p. 73, In. 3-21. 
Following a court trial on March 10,2009, the magistrate found that Mr. Herren violated 
I.C. § 18-920 because he knowingly remained within 100 feet ofMr. McDermott at the 
homeowners association annual meeting. Id. at p. 174, In. 23 - p. 175, In. 3. On April 7, 2009, 
the state accused Mr. Herren of violating his probation in the 2007 case by committing the new 
crime of violating I.C. § 18-920. R. 93-94. On April 19, 2010, Mr. Herren admitted violating the 
conditions of his probation in the injury to property case by being found guilty of committing the 
new crime alleged in the NCO case. Mag. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 3, In. 19 - p. 4, In. 4. 
Mr. Herren appealed to the district court challenging both his judgment of conviction for 
violation of the NCO and the probation violation. R. 149-51; 491-93. The district court granted 
Mr. Herren's request to consolidate the two cases on appeal. R. 163,505. The district court 
affirmed Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction and the fmding that he violated his probation. R. 
247-54,588-596. Mr. Herren further appealed to this Court and the case was assigned to the Court 
of Appeals. 
In a published opinion, Judge Gutierrezjoined by Judge Melanson held that "by its plain 
language, section 18-920(2) only criminalizes violations of an NCO where the violation was 
contact in the form of physical touching and/or communicating." Opinion, p. 6. The Court 
explained that although it was possible the Legislature did not: 
consciously [intend] to exclude the activity at issue in this case, that is exactly what 
it did by its choice of language, and we are constrained by adherence to our rules of 
statutory construction to give effect to the plain language of the statute. Indeed, 
there is an argument that had the Legislature intended the interpretation urged by 
the State, it would have stated in the statute that any violation of an NCO could 
form the basis of the offense, as opposed to explicitly requiring "contact" in 
violation of an NCO. See, e.g., I.C. § 18-7905 (defining first degree stalking as, 
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inter alia, a violation ofIdaho Code § 18-7906 and where the "actions constituting 
the offense are in violation of a temporary restraining order, protection order, no 
contact order or injunction, or any combination thereof'). 
Jd. atp. 7. 
The Court of Appeals noted that it was undisputed that Mr. Herren's conviction rested on 
his knowingly remaining within Mr. McDermott's presence and such conduct does not necessarily 
involve contact. Jd. Thus, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the conviction 
and that the district court's decision affirming the conviction must be reversed. !d. Because the 
magistrate's finding that Mr. Herren violated probation was premised upon this conviction, the 
Court concluded that the order revoking Mr. Herren's withheld judgment must also be reversed. 
Jd. Judge Gratton dissented, opining that the "term 'contact' is, by virtue of the statutory language 
in I.C. § 18-920 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2, defined as that which is set out in the no contact 
order itself." Jd. at p. 8. 
The State timely petitioned for review, which this Court accepted. 
ARGUMENT 
Longstanding Principles of Statutory Construction Compel the Conclusion That 
Section 18-920 Requires Contact Within the Ordinary Meaning of the Word in 
Order to Establish a Criminal Violation of the NCO and This Court Must Therefore 
Vacate Mr. Herren's Judgment of Conviction Because the Magistrate Rested its 
Finding of Guilt on Mr. Herren's Conduct in Remaining Within 100 Feet of Mr. 
McDermott 
The legislature specifically defined the offense of "violation of a no contact order" as 
being committed when a person has contact with the stated person in violation of the no contact 
order. I.C. § 18-920(2)(c). According to the State, "the no contact order itself defines the 
prohibited contact and any violation of the terms of a no contact order is sufficient to charge a 
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crime under I.C. § 18-920(2). Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review 
("Respondent's Brief') p. 9-10. To accept this interpretation, this Court would be required to set 
aside several well-established principles of statutory construction, including (l) that absent a 
specific legislative definition, courts must give the words of a statute their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning and (2) that statutes must be read to give effect to every word, clause and 
sentence and that courts must not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of its 
provisions. 
Section 18-920 plainly makes it a crime for a person to have "contact with the stated 
person in violation of an order." Because the legislature elected not to define "contact" for 
purposes of the NCO statute, that word must be given its ordinary meaning. Further, the State did 
not argue and the magistrate did not find that Mr. Herren had contact with Mr. McDermott. 
Instead, the magistrate rested its finding of guilty entirely on the conclusion Mr. Herren knowingly 
remained with 100 feet of Mr. McDermott. This Court should therefore reverse the district 
court's order affirming Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction for violation of an NCO and 
affirming revocation of his withheld judgment. 
A. Standard of Review 
In reviewing an Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, this Court gives serious consideration to 
the views of the Court of Appeals while directly reviewing the decisions of the lower courts. 
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,207,207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). On review of a decision ofthe 
district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, this Court reviews the decision of the district 
court directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008); State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215,217 (Ct. App. 2008). This Court examines the 
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magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those 
findings. !d. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the 
district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, this Court will affirm the district court's decision 
as a matter of procedure. Id. 
This Court exercises free review over questions of law. State v. 0 'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 
245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990). Statutory construction is a question oflaw. State v. Hickman, 146 
Idaho 178, 184, 191 P.3d 1098, 1104 (2008); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689, 85 P.3d 656, 
665 (2004). The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words ofthe statute; those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as 
a whole. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893,265 P.3d 502, 
506 (2011). Additionally, words of common usage must be given their usual, plain or ordinary 
meaning. State v. Riley, 83 Idaho 346, 350, 362 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1961). 
B. Section 18-920 Requires Contact Within the Ordinary Meaning of the Word in 
Order to Establish a Criminal Violation of the NCO 
The crime of "violation of a no contact order is committed when" a person has been 
"charged or convicted under" an enumerated offense, a NCO has been issued and the "person 
charged or convicted has had contact with the stated person in violation of an order. I.C. § 
18-920(2)( c). Thus, to prove a criminal violation of an NCO, the statute plainly requires the State 
to prove: (1) there is a charge or conviction for an enumerated offense; (2) a NCO has been 
issued; (3) the person contacted the protected person; and (4) the contact was in violation of the 
NCO (as opposed to falling within an exception, such as permitted contact to participate in 
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counseling or to respond to emergencies concerning shared children). 
Had the legislature wished to criminalize any violation of the terms of a NCO, regardless 
of whether it involved contact with the protected person, it could have simply provided that the 
offense was committed when the person charged or convicted violates a term of the NCO. 
Instead, the legislature limited which NCO violations constitute a new criminal offense to those 
that involve contact with the protected person in violation of the NCO. 
The State asserts that it is "untenable" to say that the term "contact" in I.C. § 18-920(2)( c) 
does not draw meaning from the NCO and that to ignore the context in which the word "contact" 
occurs disregards the rule requiring that the statute be construed as a whole. Respondent's Brief, 
p. 10. However, to accept this position, it is necessary to eviscerate the word "contact" from the 
statute and disregard the longstanding rules that statutory terms be given their ordinary meaning 
unless otherwise defined and that each word in a statute be given effect and not treated as 
surplusage. This Court should decline to adopt the State's strained interpretation of the statute 
and instead apply its plain meaning by limiting criminal violations of an NCO to those violations 
that involve "contact with the stated person" as the term "contact" is ordinarily construed. 
1. This Court should not treat the phrase "contact with the protected person" as 
mere surplusage 
It is well established that statutes must be read to give effect to every word, clause and 
sentence and that courts must not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of its 
provisions. See State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866,264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011); see also Bradbury 
v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116,233 P.3d 38, 47 (2009) (courts will not construe a 
statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions included therein); Sweitzer v. Dean, 
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118 Idaho 568, 571-72, 798 P.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (same); University o/Utah Hospital and 
Medical Center v. Bethke, 101 Idaho 245, 611 P.2d 1030 (1980)(same). By asking this Court to 
read the phrase "contact with the stated person" out of the statute, the State's interpretation stands 
in direct contradiction to this rule. 
The State's position is that "contact" is defined by the NCO and thus any conduct in 
violation of the NCO is a new crime even ifit does not involve "contact with the stated person." 
This position literally requires the Court to read the statute as if the word "contact" does not exist 
and therefore a new crime is committed when any term of the NCO is violated regardless of 
whether the conduct involved "contact." This reading ofthe statute is simply illogical- why 
would the legislature insert the word "contact" when it really intended any NCO violation to be a 
new crime? It would have been simple enough to define the offense as being committed when the 
"person charged or convicted" violates the NCO, instead of specifYing "contact with the stated 
person." 
The State's interpretation that the legislature meant to criminalize all NCO violations 
regardless of whether the violation involved contact with the stated person would require this 
Court to treat the term "contact" as mere surplusage. Instead, this Court should apply the plain 
meaning of the literal meaning of the words in the statute by concluding that it is a crime to have 
contact with the stated person in violation of a no contact order. 
2. This Court should apply the common meaning of the word "contact" 
It is well established that courts must construe statutory terms according to their plain, 
obvious, and rational meanings. See e.g. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009) 
(courts gives the words of a statute their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning); State v. Hart, 135 
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Idaho 827, 829,25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001) (same); Nelson By and Through Nelson v. City of 
Rupert, 128 Idaho 199,201,911 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1996) (courts must construe statutory tenns 
according to their plain, obvious, and rational meanings); Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho 
427,430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990) (ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when 
construing a statute). The State fails to provide any authority to support its contrary argument that 
the absence of statutory definition instead signifies that the word "contact" means whatever 
conduct the presiding judge decides to prohibit in the NCO. 
The dissent opined that the "plain meaning of a word is as commonly understood and 
articulated within the context used, not some generic Webster's Dictionary definition." Opinion, 
p. 10. However, re-defining "contact" as any NCO violation stands the ordinary meaning of the 
tenn on its head. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, "contact" is not commonly re-defined as 
any NCO violation in the NCO context. See Mag. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 172, In. 1-1 0 (emphasis added) 
(magistrate found that "the 100 feet [prohibition] prevents awkwardness even if no contact were 
to occur at all."). 
Further, a standard NCO could be violated in any number of ways without having "contact 
with the stated person in violation of an order." For instance, NCOs commonly prohibit a person 
from coming within a certain distance of the protected person's residence and workplace. See 
States Exhibit 2 (fonn NCO). This provision could be violated if the defendant intentionally 
waited until the protected person left the residence, entered it to retrieve belongings that had been 
left behind prior to the NCO and left the premises before the protected person returned. The 
provision could also be violated if the defendant went to the protected person's work knowing he 
or she was on lunch break or absent to visit another employee. Each scenario involves a clear 
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violation of the NCO's tenn prohibiting the defendant from coming with a certain distance of 
protected places. Neither involves "contact with the stated person" under any sensible 
construction of the phrase. 
Nor is it illogical to limit new criminal offenses to those cases that involve contact in 
violation of the NCO. As noted by the magistrate, there are sound reasons for distance 
restrictions. However, entering the protected person's residence (which many times was also the 
defendant's residence prior to the NCO) while the protected person is not home is not as serious 
as purposely contacting the protected person, whether in person or otherwise. It makes sense to 
have less serious violations of an NCO punishable by contempt or as a bailor probation violation 
and only criminalizing more egregious violations of the NCO. 
3. Alaska's decision in Cooper 
The State contends Mr. Herren and the Court of Appeals mistakenly relied on Cooper v. 
Cooper, 144 P.3d 451,457-58 (Alaska 2006) because the statute interpreted by Cooper differs 
from Section 18-920. Respondent's Brief, p. 10. As has been previously explained, Mr. Herren 
cites to Cooper because the Court utilized Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
definition of "contact" as setting forth common usage of the tenn in construing protective orders. 
Appellant's Reply, p. 2. Use of a dictionary definition to help define the ordinary meaning of a 
word is not limited to Alaska. See e.g. Two Jinn, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Ins. , Idaho Supreme Court 
Docket No. 38759, p. 5 (January 11,2013) (discussing plain dictionary definitions of statute's 
words in construing its meaning); State v. Straub, 292 P.3d 273, _ (2013) (same); State v. Lee, 
153 Idaho 559, 562, 286 P.3d 537, 540 (2012) (same); Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867, 264 P.3d 974 
(same). 
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The Cooper decision is pertinent to this case because it construed the ordinary meaning of 
the word "contact" in the context of protection orders. The distinctions between the Alaska and 
Idaho statute are irrelevant as to whether the ordinary meaning of "contact" should be applied 
here. 
4. Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2 does not define the substantive offense of violation 
ofa NCO 
The State relies on the provisions ofI.C.R. 46(e) to support that the term "contact with the 
stated person" really means violation of any NCO term. Respondent's Brief, p. 9. However, it is 
the legislature's role to define substantive law such as crimes and not the courts. See In re SRBA 
Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995). Under the state's proffered 
interpretation, judges or rule committees are left to decide what might constitute a subsequent 
criminal violation of a NCO depending on the conduct that is prohibited by the NCO. The 
legislature curbed this authority by clarifYing that a criminal violation of a NCO only occurs when 
a person "has contact" in violation of the order. It is also clear from the required language in the 
no contact order itself, which includes an advisory that violation of the order may be prosecuted 
under I.C. § 18-920, that it is the "contact" described in the order which is punishable under I.C. § 
18-920. 
It is the plain language of the statute, not the criminal rule, that defines the crime of 
violating an NCO. Pursuant to the plain language of I.C. § 18-920, a person only commits the 
offense set forth in that section by having contact with the stated perosn in violation ofthe no 
contact order. I. C. § 18-920(2)( c). 
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C. No Substantial Evidence Supports a Conviction for Violating an NCO Because the 
Magistrate Did Not Find That Mr. Herren Contacted Mr. McDermott and Based its 
Finding of Guilt Entirely on its Conclusion That Mr. Herren Remained Within 100 
Feet of Mr. McDermott 
As found by the Court of Appeals: 
it is undisputed the lower courts found Herren's act of knowingly remaining within 
100 feet of McDermott was violative of the NCO. However, such an act does not 
amount to physical touching andlor communicating (a point the State does not 
contest) and, thus, cannot be considered "contact" pursuant to section 18-920(2). 
Accordingly, we conclude the State failed to sustain its burden of proving each 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no evidence 
Herren had "contact" with McDermott in violation of the NCO as required by the 
plain language of the statute. 
Opinion, p. 7. 
In its brief on Review, the State notes there was testimony that when Mr. McDermott 
entered the room, Mr. Herren smiled at him and made eye contact. Respondent's Brief, p. 3. 
Although it does not specifically argue to this Court that this conduct was "contact," it did so 
argue to the district court. See R. 563-64. It is thus worth noting that the alleged eye contact 
cannot support Mr. Herren's conviction under the correct interpretation of the statute. Initially, 
during trial, the State did not argue that Mr. Herren's brief eye contact violated the no contact 
order and, on the contrary, argued to the magistrate that if Mr. Herren had left the meeting after 
making eye contact with Mr. McDermott "we wouldn't even be in this situation." Tr. (CR-MD-
2009-1176) p. 166, In. 20-21. As the State acknowledged, predicating a criminal violation ofLC. 
§ 18-920 on the type of brief eye contact that occurred here, which was nothing more than 
recognizing one another's presence - does not constitute a criminal violation of a no contact 
order: 
It's kind oflike somebody who - a no-contact order is in place and they go to the 
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grocery store ... and if they see the protected party in the grocery store ... a public 
place, something that's open to the public, and they make eye contact or they see 
the protected party and if that person then leaves the store, we're not going to be in 
a situation where a violation of a no-contact order is about because that person 
does not knowingly remain in the presence of the protected party. 
Tr. Mag. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 166, In. 21 - 167, In. 7. Similarly, the magistrate based its finding of guilt 
on the finding that Mr. Herren knowingly remained within 100 feet and did not find him guilty for 
his brief eye contact with Mr. McDermott before moving to th~ back of the room. ld. at p. 172, 
In. 11 - 174, In. 24. 
The state did not argue and the magistrate did not find that Mr. Herren violated I.e. § 18-
920 by having brief eye contact with Mr. McDermott. Accordingly, even if such eye contact 
could be construed as "contact" within the ordinary meaning of the term, Mr. Herren's judgment 
of conviction cannot be sustained on that basis. 
Further, brief eye contact such as may have occurred here is not "contact" within the 
common meaning of the term. In common usage, "contacting" means physically touching or 
communicating. See Cooper, 144 P.3d at 457-58 (Alaska 2006) (utilizing Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary definition of "contact" as setting forth common usage of the term in 
construing protective orders). Indeed, the problems with construing such brief eye contact as 
constituting contact for purposes of I.e. § 18-920 is well illustrated by the prosecutor's comments 
during closing argument cited above. The problems with enforcing and complying with such an 
order would be insurmountable. 
This is not to say that knowingly remaining within one hundred feet or eye contact and 
facial expressions could never support a conviction under I.e. § 18-920. For instance, 
intentionally placing oneself within the distance restriction combined with prolonged eye contact, 
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facial expressions or other non verbal communication could be reasonably construed as contact as 
the word is normally understood. In some cases, such as a direct text message or addressing the 
person face to face, the contact requirement has clearly been met. In other cases, whether a 
defendant has had contact with the protected person in violation of the order will be a closer call. 
In such cases, juries are well-equipped to consider the ordinary meaning of "contact" and to 
determine whether a crime has been committed. 
The magistrate neither found, nor was there substantial evidence to demonstrate, that Mr. 
Herren contacted Mr. McDermott within the ordinary meaning of that term. The magistrate 
instead found that Mr. Herren violated the NCO by knowingly remaining within 100 feet of Mr. 
McDermott. Although arguably a violation of the NCO's terms, knowingly remaining within 100 
feet of another is not a violation of the NCO by having contact and therefore is not a criminal 
violation of I.e. § 18-920. Mr. Herren's judgment of conviction must therefore be vacated. 
D. Because the Conviction in the 2009 Case is Unlawful, the Magistrate's Order Finding 
That Mr. Herren Violated His Probation and Revoking His Withheld Judgment 
Must be Vacated 
A court may not revoke probation without a finding that the probationer violated the terms 
of probation. State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007); State v. Blake, 133 
Idaho 237, 243, 985 P.2d 117, 123 (1999); see also I.C. §§ 19-2603,20-222. In probation 
violation proceedings, the State bears the burden of providing satisfactory proof of a violation and 
the court's finding of a probation violation must be on verified facts. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765, 171 
P.3d at 256. 
Here, the magistrate's finding that Mr. Herren violated his probation was based solely on 
his admission to being found guilty of violating I.C. § 18-920. As set forth above, that finding of 
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guilt and the resulting conviction must be vacated. It therefore follows that the magistrate's order 
finding that Mr. Herren violated his probation, therefore revoking its order withholding judgment 
must similarly be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons stated above and in Mr. Herren's briefing before the Court of Appeals, 
this Court should reverse the district court's order on intermediate appeal affirming Mr. Herren's 
judgment of conviction for violation of a no contact order pursuant to I.C. § 18-920 and affirming 
revocation ofMr. Herren's withheld judgment. 
DATED this t ~y of February, 2013. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~~~g 9:--'1~~ 
Robyn Fyffe \ 
Attorneys for Nathan Wade Herren 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on February 'IS ,2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 




to: Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise,ID 83720-0010 
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